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Abstract—Quantum Decision Theory, advanced earlier by the
authors, and illustrated for lotteries with gains, is generalized
to the games containing lotteries with gains as well as losses.
The mathematical structure of the approach is based on the
theory of quantum measurements, which makes this approach
relevant both for the description of decision making of humans
and the creation of artificial quantum intelligence. General rules
are formulated allowing for the explicit calculation of quan-
tum probabilities representing the fraction of decision makers
preferring the considered prospects. This provides a method to
quantitatively predict decision-maker choices, including the cases
of games with high uncertainty for which the classical expected
utility theory fails. The approach is applied to experimental
results obtained on a set of lottery gambles with gains and losses.
Our predictions, involving no fitting parameters, are in very
good agreement with experimental data. The use of quantum
decision making in game theory is described. A principal scheme
of creating quantum artificial intelligence is suggested.
Index Terms—Quantum decision theory, decision making,
choice between lotteries, attraction index, quantitative predic-
tions, game theory, artificial intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical decision making, based on expected utility theory
[1], is known to fail in many cases when decisions are made
under risk and uncertainty. Numerous variants of so-called
non-expected utility theories have been suggested to replace
expected utility theory by using other more complicated func-
tionals. The long list of such non-expected utility models can
be found in the review articles [2]–[4]. The non-expected util-
ity theories are, by construction, descriptive. By introducing
several fitting parameters, such theories can be calibrated to
some given set of empirical data. However, it is often possible
to have different theories fitting the same set of experiments
equally well, so that it is difficult to distinguish which of the
models is better [5]. Moreover, on the basis of such theories,
it is impossible to account for the known paradoxes arising
in classical decision making and to make convincing out-of-
sample predictions of new sets of empirical data. The non-
expected utility theories have been thoroughly analyzed in
numerous publications confirming the descriptive nature of
these theories and their inability to perform useful predictions
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(see, e.g., [6]–[10]). Thus, Birnbaum [6], [7] carefully studied
the so-called rank dependent utility theory and cumulative
prospect theory, concluding that, even with fitting parameters,
these theories are not able to get rid of paradoxes and moreover
create new paradoxes. Safra and Segal [8] state that none of the
non-expected utility theories can explain all main paradoxes
but, on the contrary, distorting the structure of expected utility
theory, the non-expected utility theories result in several non-
expected inconsistencies. Al-Najjar and Weinstein [9], [10]
present a detailed analysis of non-expected utility theories,
coming to the conclusion that any variation of expected utility
theory ”ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistences
than it resolves”.
The same conclusions apply to the so-called stochastic deci-
sion theories [11]–[13] that are based on underlying determin-
istic theories, decorating them with the probability of making
errors in the choice. Introducing such probabilities, caused
by decision-maker errors, into the log-likelihood functional
adds several more parameters in the calibration exercise that
improve the description of the given set of data. But such
a stochastic decoration does not change the structure of the
underlying deterministic theory and does not make predictions
possible.
Clearly, the possibility of making predictions can be
strongly hindered by the presence of unknown or poorly
formulated conditions accompanying decision making. For
instance, there can exist an unknown stochastic environment
[14] or a varying context [15]. It may also happen that the
provided information is imprecise and only partially reliable
[16] or preference relations are incomplete [17] requiring the
use of fuzzy logic [18]. In such situations, any prediction is
likely to be only partial and often merely qualitative.
But even when the posed problem is well defined, sug-
gesting, e.g., a choice between explicitly presented lotteries,
quantitative predictions as a rule are impossible. In particular,
the non-expected utility theories mentioned above have been
developed exactly for such seemingly simple choice between
well defined lotteries. And, as is discussed above, in many
cases, the given lotteries, although being explicitly formulated,
contain uncertainty not allowing for predictions. It is important
to also stress that, in some cases of well defined lotteries,
predictions based on utility theory are qualitatively wrong, as
has been demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky [19].
In the present paper, we consider the situation when decision
making consists in the choice between well defined lotteries.
We develop an approach allowing for quantitative predictions
in arbitrary cases, including those where utility theory fails,
being unable to provide even qualitatively correct conclusions.
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2It is important to emphasize that quantitative predictions in our
approach can be realized without any fitting parameters. So,
our approach is not a descriptive, but rather a normative, or
prescriptive theory.
Our approach is based on Quantum Decision Theory (QDT),
which we developed earlier [20]–[26]. There have been other
attempts to apply quantum techniques to cognitive sciences,
as is discussed in the books [27]–[30] and review articles
[31]–[34]. However, these attempts were based on constructing
some models for describing particular effects, with the use of
several fitting parameters for each case. Our approach of QDT
is essentially different from all those models in the following
facets. First, QDT is formulated as a general theory applicable
to any variant of decision making, but not as a special model
for a particular case. Second, the mathematical structure of
QDT is common for both decision theory as well as for quan-
tum measurements, which has been achieved by generalizing
the von Neumann [35] theory of quantum measurements to the
treatment of inconclusive measurements and composite events
represented by noncommutative operators [36]–[39]. The third
unique feature of QDT is the possibility to develop quantitative
predictions without any fitting parameters, as has been shown
for some simple choices in decision making [40].
The predictions concern the fractions of decision makers
choosing the corresponding lotteries. In QDT, such fractions
are predicted by their corresponding behavioral quantum
probabilities, as follows from the frequentist interpretation
of probabilities and the assumption that the population of
decision makers are, to a first approximation, representative
of a homogenous group of individuals making probabilistic
choices. The scheme for calculating the quantum probabilities
is based on our previous demonstration that it consists of
two terms, called utility and attraction factors. The utility
factor derives from the utility of each lottery, being defined
on prescribed rational grounds. The attraction factor represents
the irrational side of a choice. The value of the attraction factor
for a single decision maker and for a given choice is random.
However, for a society of decision makers, one can derive
the quarter law, which estimates the non-informative prior for
the absolute value of the average attraction factor as equal to
1/4. In simple cases, the signs of the attraction factors can
be prescribed by the principle of ambiguity aversion. In more
complicated situations, a criterion has been suggested [40] and
applied to lotteries with gains.
Here, we extend Ref. [40] by considering lotteries with both
gains and losses, and not just gains. We also improve on the
quarter law based on the non-informative prior, by including
available information on the level of ambiguity characterizing
a given set of games, thus providing the potential for improved
predictions. Moreover, we consider the cases for which our
previously proposed criterion defining the signs of attraction
factors does not allow for unique conclusions. We present a
generalization of the criterion for the sign of the attraction
factors that addresses these limitations and also applies to
lotteries with losses.
The possibility of mathematically formalizing all steps of
a decision process, allowing for quantitative predictions, is
important, not merely for decision theory, but also for the
problem of creating an artificial quantum intelligence that
could function only if all operations are explicitly formalized
in mathematical terms. We have previously mentioned [41]
that QDT can provide such a basis for creating artificial
quantum intelligence, since the QDT mathematical foundation
is formulated in the same way as the theory of quantum
measurements.
In the present paper, we overcome the limitations of our
previous publication [40] by generalizing QDT along the
following directions.
(i) A general method for defining utility factors is advanced,
valid for lotteries with losses as well as for lotteries with gains,
or mixed-type lotteries.
(ii) A criterion is formulated for the quantitative classifica-
tion of attraction factors for all kinds of lotteries, whether with
gains or with losses. In the case of games with two lotteries,
this criterion uniquely prescribes the signs of attraction factors.
(iii) The quarter law is generalized by taking into account
the ambiguity level for a given set of games. This defines the
typical absolute value of the attraction factor more accurately
than the quarter law following from non-informative prior.
(iv) A method for estimating attraction factors for games
with multiple lotteries is described.
(v) The value of our theory is illustrated by comparing
its prediction with empirical results obtained on a set of
games containing lotteries with gains and with losses, for
which expected utility theory fails. Our approach results in
quantitative predictions, without fitting parameters, which are
in very good agreement with empirical data.
(vi) It is shown how the QDT can be applied to game theory.
An application is illustrated by the prisoner dilemma.
(vii) The general principles for creating artificial quantum
intelligence are suggested. It is emphasized that artificial intel-
ligence, mimicking the functioning of human consciousness,
should be quantum.
II. SCHEME OF QUANTUM DECISION THEORY
In the present section, we briefly sketch the basic scheme
of QDT in order to remind the reader about the definition of
quantum probability used in decision theory. The technical de-
tails have been thoroughly expounded in the previous articles
[20]–[26], which allows us to just recall here the basic notions.
As is mentioned in the Introduction, the mathematical
scheme is equally applicable to quantum decision theory as
well as to the theory of quantum measurements [36]–[39].
An event can mean either the result of an estimation in the
process of measurements, or a decision in decision making. In
both the cases, there exist simple events that are operationally
testable, that is, clearly observable, and inconclusive events
that are either non-observable or even not well specified. The
typical example in quantum measurements is the double-slit
experiment, where the final registration of a particle by a
detector is an operationally testable event, while the passage
through one of the slits is not observable. In decision mak-
ing, a straightforward example would be the choice between
lotteries under uncertainty. The final choice of a lottery is an
operationally testable event, while the deliberations on real
3or imaginary uncertainties in the formulation of the lotteries
or in hesitations of the decision-maker can be treated as
inconclusive events.
We consider a set of events {An} labelled by an index
n = 1, 2, . . .. Each event An is put into correspondence with
a state |n〉 of a Hilbert space HA, with the family of states
{|n〉} forming an orthonormalized basis:
An → |n〉 ∈ HA = span{|n〉} . (1)
There also exists another set of events {Bα}, labelled by an
index α = 1, 2, . . ., with each event being in correspondence
with a state |α〉 of a Hilbert space HB , the family of the states
{|α〉} forming an orthonormalized basis:
Bα → |α〉 ∈ HB = span{|α〉} . (2)
A pair of events from different sets forms a composite event
An
⊗
Bα represented by a tensor-product state |n〉
⊗ |α〉,
An
⊗
Bα → |n〉
⊗
|α〉 ∈ H , (3)
in the Hilbert space
H ≡ HA
⊗
HB = span{|n〉
⊗
|α〉} . (4)
An event An is called operationally testable if and only if
it induces a projector |n〉〈n| on the space HA. The event set
{An} is assumed to consist of operationally testable events.
A different situation occurs when we have an inconclusive
event being a set
B ≡ {Bα, bα : α = 1, 2, . . .} (5)
of events Bα associated with amplitudes bα that are random
complex numbers. An inconclusive event corresponds to a
state |B〉 in the space HB , such that
B→ |B〉 =
∑
α
bα|α〉 ∈ HB . (6)
The states |Bα〉 are not orthonormalized, because of which the
operator |B〉〈B| is not a projector.
A composite event is termed a prospect. Of major interest
are the prospects composed of an operationally testable event
and an inconclusive event:
pin = An
⊗
B . (7)
A prospect corresponds to a prospect state in the space H,
pin → |pin〉 = |n〉
⊗
|B〉 ∈ H , (8)
and induces a prospect operator
Pˆ (pin) ≡ |pin〉〈pin| . (9)
The prospect states are not orthonormalized and the prospect
operator is not a projector. The given set of prospects forms
a lattice
L = {pin : n = 1, 2, . . . , NL} , (10)
whose ordering is characterized by prospect probabilities to be
defined below. The assembly of prospect operators {Pˆ (pin)}
composes a positive operator-valued measure. By its role, this
set is analogous to the algebra of local observables in quantum
theory.
The strategic state of a decision maker in decision theory,
or statistical operator of a system in physics, is a semipositive
trace-one operator ρˆ defined on the space H. The prospect
probability is the expectation value of the prospect operator:
p(pin) = TrρˆPˆ (pin) , (11)
with the trace over the spaceH. To form a probability measure,
the prospect probabilities are normalized,∑
n
p(pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(pin) ≤ 1 . (12)
Taking the trace in (11), it is possible to separate out positive-
defined terms from sign-undefined terms, which respectively,
are
f(pin) =
∑
α
| bα |2〈nα|ρˆ|nα〉 ,
q(pin) =
∑
α6=β
b∗αbβ〈nα|ρˆ|nβ〉 . (13)
Then the prospect probability reads as
p(pin) = f(pin) + q(pin) . (14)
The appearance of a sign-undefined term is typical for quan-
tum theory, describing the effects of interference and coher-
ence.
Note that the decision-maker strategic state has to be charac-
terized by a statistical operator and not just by a wave function
since, in real life, any decision maker is not an isolated object
but a member of a society [38], [40].
An important role in quantum theory is played by the
quantum-classical correspondence principle [42], [43], ac-
cording to which classical theory has to be a particular case
of quantum theory. In the present consideration, this is to be
understood as the reduction of quantum probability to classical
probability under the decaying quantum term:
p(pin)→ f(pin) , q(pin)→ 0 . (15)
In quantum physics, this is also called decoherence, when
quantum measurements are reduced to classical measurements.
The positive-definite term f(pin), playing the role of classical
probability, is to be normalized,∑
n
f(pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ f(pin) ≤ 1 . (16)
From conditions (12) and (16) it follows∑
n
q(pin) = 0 , −1 ≤ q(pin) ≤ 1 , (17)
which is called the alternation law.
In decision theory, the classical part f(pin) describes the
utility of the prospect pin, which is defined on rational grounds.
In that sense, a prospect pi1 is more useful than pi2 if and only
if
f(pi1) > f(pi2) (more useful) . (18)
The quantum part q(pin) characterizes the attractiveness of
the prospect, which is based on irrational subconscious factors.
Hence a prospect pi1 is more attractive than pi2 if and only if
q(pi1) > q(pi2) (more attractive) . (19)
4And the prospect probability (14) defines the summary
preferability of the prospect, taking into account both its utility
and attractiveness. So, a prospect pi1 is preferable to pi2 if and
only if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (preferable) . (20)
The structure of the quantum probability (14), consisting
of two parts, one showing the utility of a prospect and
the other characterizing its attractiveness, is representative of
real-life decision making, where both these constituents are
typically present. Quantum probability, taking into account the
rationally defined utility as well as such an irrational behav-
ioral feature as attractiveness, can be termed as behavioral
probability.
It is worth stressing that QDT is an intrinsically prob-
abilistic theory. This is different from stochastic decision
theories, where the choice is assumed to be deterministic,
while randomness arises due to errors in decision making.
The probabilistic nature of QDT is not caused by errors in
decision making, but it is due to the natural state of a decision
maker, described by a kind of statistical operator. Upon the
reduction of QDT to a classical decision theory, it reduces
to a probabilistic variant of the latter, since decisions under
uncertainty are necessarily probabilistic [44]. As mentioned
above, the description of a decision maker strategic state by
a statistical operator, and not by a wave function, emphasizes
the fact that any decision maker is not an absolutely isolated
object but rather a member of a society, who is subjected to
social interactions [38], [40], [45]. When comparing theoreti-
cal predictions with empirical data, it follows from the logical
structure of QDT that one has to compare the theoretically
calculated probability (14) with the fraction of decision makers
preferring the considered prospect.
III. GENERAL DEFINITION OF UTILITY FACTORS
In this section, we describe the general method for defining
utility factors for a given set of lotteries containing both gains
as well as losses.
Let a set of payoffs be given
Xn = {xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nn} , (21)
in which payoffs can represent either gains or losses, being,
respectively positive or negative. The probability distribution
over a payoff set is a lottery
Ln = {xi, pn(xi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , Nn} , (22)
with the normalization condition∑
i
pn(xi) = 1 , 0 ≤ pn(xi) ≤ 1 . (23)
The lotteries are enumerated by the index n = 1, 2, . . . , NL.
Under a utility function u(x), the expected utility of lottery
Ln is
U(Ln) =
∑
i
u(xi)pn(xi) (n = 1, 2, . . . , NL) . (24)
Utility functions for gains and losses can be of different
signs. Therefore, the expected utility can also be either positive
or negative. When it is negative, one often uses the notation
of the lottery cost
C(Ln) ≡ −U(Ln) = |U(Ln)| (U(Ln) < 0) .
An expected utility is positive, when in its payoffs gains
prevail. And it is negative, when losses overwhelm gains.
As has been explained in Ref. [40], the choice between
the given lotteries in any game is always accompanied by
uncertainty related to the decision-maker hesitations with
respect to the formulation of the game rules, understanding
of the problem, and his/her ability to decide what he/she
considers the correct choice. All these hesitations form an
inconclusive event denoted above as B. Therefore a choice
of a lottery Ln is actually a composite event, or a prospect
pin = Ln
⊗
B (n = 1, 2, . . . , NL) . (25)
Here we denote the action of a lottery choice and a lottery
by the same latter Ln, which should not lead to confusion.
The utility factor f(pin) characterizes the utility of choosing
a lottery Ln. Since QDT postulates that the choice is proba-
bilistic, it is possible to define the average quantity over the
set of lotteries,
U =
NL∑
n=1
f(pin)U(Ln) , (26)
playing the role of a normalization condition for random
expected utilities [46].
The utility factor represents a classical probability distri-
bution and can be found from the conditional minimization
of Kullback-Leibler information [47], [48]. The use of the
Kullback-Leibler information for defining such a probability
distribution is justified by the Shore-Jonson theorem [49]
stating that there exists only one distribution satisfying consis-
tency conditions, and this distribution is uniquely defined by
the minimum of the Kullback-Leibler information, under given
constraints. The role of the constraints here are played by the
normalization conditions (16) and (26). Then the information
functional reads as
I[ f ] =
NL∑
n=1
f(pin) ln
f(pin)
f0(pin)
+
+ γ
[
NL∑
n=1
f(pin)− 1
]
+ β
[
U −
NL∑
n=1
f(pin)Un
]
, (27)
where f0(pin) is a prior distribution, Un ≡ U(Ln), and β and
γ are Lagrange multipliers.
As boundary conditions, it is natural to require that the
utility factor of a lottery with asymptotically large expected
utility would tend to unity,
f(pin)→ 1 (Un →∞) , (28)
while the utility factor of a lottery with asymptotically large
cost, would go to zero,
f(pin)→ 0 (Un → −∞) . (29)
5Also, the utility factors, as their name implies, have to increase
together with the related expected utilities,
δf(pin)
δUn
≥ 0 . (30)
Minimizing the information functional (27) results in the
utility factors
f(pin) =
f0(pin)e
βUn∑
n f0(pin)e
βUn
, (31)
with a non-negative parameter β.
If one assumes that the prior distribution is uniform, such
that f0(pin) = 1/NL, then one comes to the utility factors
of the logit form. However, the uniform distribution does
not satisfy the boundary conditions (28) to (29). Therefore
a more accurate assumption, taking into account the boundary
conditions, should be based on the Luce choice axiom [50],
[51]. According to this axiom, if an n-th object, from the given
set of objects, is scaled by a quantity λn, then the probability
of its choice is
f0(pin) =
λn∑
n λn
. (32)
In our case, the considered objects are lotteries and they
are scaled by their expected utilities. So, for the non-negative
utilities, we can set
λn = Un (Un ≥ 0) , (33)
while for negative utilities,
λn =
1
|Un| (Un < 0) . (34)
Expression (34) is chosen in order to comply with Luce’s
axiom together with the ranking of preferences with respect
to losses.
Generally, utilities can be measured in some units, say, in
monetary units M . Then we could use dimensionless scales λn
defined as Un/M and M/Un for gains and losses, respectively.
Obviously, expression (32) is invariant with respect to units in
which λn is measured. Therefore, for simplicity of notation,
we assume that utilities are dimensionless.
Thus, the utility factor (31), with prior (32), is
f(pin) =
λne
βUn∑
n λne
βUn
(β ≥ 0) . (35)
In particular, when gains prevail, so that all expected utilities
are non-negative, then
f(pin) =
Une
βUn∑
n Une
βUn
(∀ Un ≥ 0) . (36)
While, when losses prevail, and all expected utilities are
negative, then
f(pin) =
|Un|−1e−β|Un|∑
n |Un|−1e−β|Un|
(∀ Un < 0) . (37)
In the mixed case, where the utility signs can be both positive
and negative, one has to employ the general form (35).
The parameter β characterizes the belief of the decision
maker with respect to whether the problem is correctly posed.
Under strong belief, one gets
f(pin) =
{
1, Un = maxn Un
0, Un 6= maxn Un (β →∞) , (38)
which recovers the classical utility theory with the determin-
istic choice of a lottery with the largest expected utility. In the
opposite case of weak belief, when uncertainty is strong, one
has
f(pin) =
λn∑
n λn
(β = 0) . (39)
To explicitly illustrate the forms of the utility factors, let us
consider the often met situation of two lotteries under strong
uncertainty, thus, considering the binary prospect lattice
L = {pin : n = 1, 2} (β = 0) , (40)
with zero belief parameter. Then, if in both the lotteries gains
prevail, we have
f(pin) =
Un
U1 + U2
(U1 ≥ 0, U2 ≥ 0) . (41)
When losses are prevailing in the two lotteries, then
f(pin) = 1− |Un||U1|+ |U2| (U1 < 0, U2 < 0) . (42)
And if one expected utility is positive, say that of the first
lottery, while the other utility is negative, then the utility factor
for the first lottery is
f(pi1) =
U1|U2|
U1|U2|+ 1 (U1 > 0, U2 < 0) , (43)
respectively, f(pi2) = 1− f(pi1).
In this way, the utility factors are explicitly defined for any
combination of lotteries in the given game, with the payoff
sets containing gains as well losses.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF LOTTERIES BY ATTRACTION
INDICES
We now give a prescription for defining the attraction
factors. By its definition, an attraction factor quantifies how
each of the given lotteries is more or less attractive. The
attractiveness of a lottery is composed of two factors, possible
gain and its probability. It is clear that a lottery is more
attractive, when it suggests a larger gain and/or this gain is
more probable. In other words, a more attractive lottery is more
predictable and promises a larger profit. On the contrary, a
lottery suggesting a smaller gain or a larger loss and/or higher
probability of the loss, is less attractive. A less certain lottery
is less attractive, since it is less predictable, which is named
as uncertainty aversion or ambiguity aversion. Below we give
an explicit mathematical formulation of these ideas.
Let us introduce, for a lottery Ln, the notation for the
minimal gain
gn ≡ min
i
{xi ≥ 0 : xi ∈ Ln} (44)
and for the minimal loss
ln ≡ max
i
{xi ≤ 0 : xi ∈ Ln}. (45)
6These quantities characterize possible gains and losses in the
given lotteries.
But payoffs are not the only features that attract the at-
tention of decision makers. In experimental neuroscience, it
has been discovered that, during the act of choosing, the
main and foremost attention of decision makers is directed
to the payoff probabilities [52]. We capture this empirical
observation by considering different weights related to payoffs
and to their probabilities in the characterization of the lottery
attractiveness. Specifically, the weight of a payoff x should
be much smaller than the weight of its probability p(x). We
quantitatively formulate this by choosing weights proportional
respectively to x for the payoff versus 10p(x) for its probability.
The later term is motivated by the decimal number system.
This leads us to defining the lottery attractiveness
an ≡ an(Ln) ≡
∑
i
xi10
pn(xi) . (46)
And the related relative quantity can be termed the attraction
index
αn = αn(Ln) ≡ an∑
m |am|
. (47)
The latter satisfies the normalization condition∑
n
|αn| = 1 . (48)
The notion of the lottery attraction index makes it straight-
forward to classify all lotteries from the considered game onto
more or less attractive. Thus a lottery L1 is more attractive than
L2, hence
q(pi1) > q(pi2) , (49)
when the attraction index of the first lottery is larger than that
of the second,
α1 > α2 . (50)
In the marginal case, when α1 = α2 ≥ 0, the first lottery is
more attractive if the probability of its minimal gain is smaller
than that of the second lottery,
α1 = α2 ≥ 0 , p(g1) < p(g2) . (51)
For short, this will be denoted as α1 − α2 = +0. And in the
other marginal case, where α1 = α2 < 0, the first lottery is
more attractive if the probability of its minimal loss is larger
than that of the second,
α1 = α2 < 0 , p(l1) > p(l2) . (52)
This, for short, will be denoted as α1 − α2 = +0.
The criterion allows us to arrange all the given lotteries with
respect to the level of their attractiveness.
For the particular case of a binary prospect lattice (40), the
alternation property (17) reads as
q(pi1) + q(pi2) = 0 . (53)
Therefore the attraction factors have different signs,
q(pi1) = −q(pi2) . (54)
The sign of each of the attraction factors is prescribed by the
sign of the difference
∆α ≡ α1 − α2 . (55)
If ∆α is positive, then the attraction factor of the first prospect
is positive and that of the second is negative. On the contrary,
if ∆α is negative, then the attraction factor of the first lottery
is negative and that of the second is positive. In the marginal
case, when α1 = α2, we shall use the notations accepted
above and explained below (Eqs. (51) and (52)): If the first
lottery is more attractive, we shall write ∆α = +0, while when
the second lottery is more attractive, this will be denoted as
∆α = −0.
V. TYPICAL VALUES OF ATTRACTION FACTORS
The criterion of the previous section allows us to clas-
sify all the lotteries of the considered game onto more or
less attractive. But we also need to define the amplitudes
of the attraction factors. According to QDT, these values
are probabilistic variables, characterizing irrational subjective
features of each decision maker. For different subjects, they
may be different. They can also be different for the same
subject at different times [13]. Different game setups also
influence the values of the attraction factors [53]. However,
for a probabilistic quantity, it is possible to define its average
or typical value.
A. General considerations
We consider NG games, enumerated by k = 1, 2, . . . , NG,
with NL lotteries in each, enumerated by n = 1, 2, . . . , NL.
And let the choice be made by a society of N decision makers,
numbered by j = 1, 2, . . . , N . In a k-th game, decision makers
make a choice between NL prospects pink. The typical value
of the attraction factor is defined as the average
q ≡ 1
NG
NG∑
k=1
1
NL
NL∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
qj(pink)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (56)
Denoting the mean value of the attraction factor for a prospect
pin, as
| q(pin) | ≡ 1
NG
NG∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
qj(pink)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (57)
we can write
q =
1
NL
NL∑
n=1
| q(pin) | . (58)
For a large value of the product NGNLN , the distribution
of the attraction factors can be characterized by a probability
distribution ϕ(q), which, in view of property (17), is normal-
ized as ∫ 1
−1
ϕ(q) dq = 1 . (59)
The average absolute value of the attraction factor can be
represented by the integral
q =
∫ 1
0
qϕ(q) dq . (60)
7This defines the typical value of the attraction factor that
characterizes the level of deviation from rationality in decision
making [54].
If there is no information on the properties and specifics
of the given set of lotteries in the suggested games, then one
should resort to a non-informative prior, assuming a uniform
distribution satisfying normalization (59), which gives ϕ =
1/2. Substituting the uniform distribution ϕ = 1/2 into the
typical value of the attraction factor (60) yields q¯ = 0.25,
which was named the “quarter law” in the earlier paper [40].
However, it is possible to find a more precise typical value
q¯ by taking into account the available information on the given
lotteries. For example, it is straightforward to estimate the level
of uncertainty of the lottery set.
B. Choice between two prospects
When choosing between two lotteries with rather differing
utilities, the choice looks quite easy - the lottery with the
largest utility is preferred. But when two lotteries have very
close utilities, choosing becomes difficult. The closeness of
the lotteries, corresponding to two prospects pi1 and pi2, can
be quantified by the relative difference
δf(pi1, pi2) ≡ 2|f(pi1)− f(pi2)|
f(pi1) + f(pi2)
× 100% . (61)
When the choice is between just two prospects, whose utility
factors are normalized according to condition (16), hence when
f(pi1) + f(pi2) = 1, then the relative difference simplifies to
δf = 2|f(pi1)− f(pi2)| × 100% (NL = 2) . (62)
There have been many discussions concerning choices be-
tween similar alternatives with close utilities or close proba-
bilities, such that the choice becomes hard to make [55]–[58].
We refer to such situations as “irresolute”. One of the major
problems is how to quantify the similarity or closeness of the
choices. Several variants of measuring the distance between
the alternatives f1 and f2 have been suggested, including the
linear distance |f1−f2|, as well as different nonlinear distances
|f1− f2|m, with m > 0. We propose that the value of δf that
serves as an upper threshold, below which the lotteries are
irresolute, should not depend on the exponent m used in the
definition of the distance. Therefore, in order for the exponent
m not to influence the boundary value, one has to require the
invariance of the distance with respect to the exponent m at
the threshold, so that the critical threshold value should obey
the equality: (δfc)m = δfc for any m > 0. The latter reads
explicitly as
[δfc(pi1, pi2)]
m = δfc(pi1, pi2),
where δfc(pi1, pi2) is measured in percents. This equation is
valid for arbitrary m only for δfc(pi1, pi2) = 1%. Hence
the critical boundary value equals 1%. Thus the lotteries, for
which the irresoluteness criterion
δf(pi1, pi2) < 1% (63)
is valid, are to be treated as close, or similar, and the choice
between them, as irresolute.
The next question is how the irresoluteness in the choice in-
fluences the typical attraction factor. Suppose that the fraction
of irresolute games equals ν. Then the following properties of
the distribution ϕ(q) over admissible attraction factors should
hold.
In the presence of irresolute games (ν > 0) for which
the irresoluteness criterion holds true, the probability that the
attraction factor is zero is asymptotically small,
lim
q→0
ϕ(q) = 0 (ν > 0) . (64)
In other words, this condition means that, on the manifold of
all possible games, absolutely rational games form a set of
zero measure.
If not all games are irresolute (ν < 1), the probability
of the maximal absolute value of the attraction factor is
asymptotically small,
lim
|q|→1
ϕ(q) = 0 (ν < 1) . (65)
That is, on the manifold of all possible games, absolutely
irrational games compose a set of zero measure.
Often employed as a prior distribution in standard inference
tasks [59]–[61], the simplest distribution that obeys the two
conditions (64) and (65) is the beta distribution that, under
normalization (59), reads
ϕ(q) =
|q|ν(1− |q|)1−ν
Γ(1 + ν)Γ(2− ν) . (66)
Using this distribution, expression (60) gives the typical at-
traction factor value
q =
1 + ν
6
. (67)
Note that the average of q given by (67) over the two boundary
values ν = 0 and ν = 1 gives
1
2
(
1
6
+
2
6
)
=
1
4
,
thus recovering the non-informative quarter law.
This expression (67) can be used for predicting the results of
decision making. For example, in the case of a binary prospect
lattice, the difference in the attraction indices (55) defines the
signs of the attraction factors, making it possible to prescribe
the attraction factors q¯ and −q¯ to the considered prospects.
C. Choice between more than two prospects
When there are more than two prospects in the considered
game, we propose the following procedure to estimate the
attraction factors. Using the classification of the prospects by
the attraction indices, as is described in the previous section, it
is straightforward to arrange the prospects in descending order
of attractiveness,
q(pin) > q(pin+1) (n = 1, 2, . . . , NL − 1) . (68)
Let the maximal attraction factor be denoted as
qmax ≡ q(pi1) > 0 . (69)
Given the unknown values of the attraction factors, the non-
informative prior assumes that they are uniformly distributed
8and at the same time they must obey the ordering constraint
(68). Then, the joint cumulative distribution of the attraction
factors is given by
Pr[q(pi1) < η1, ..., q(piNL) < ηNL |η1 ≤ η2 ≤ ... ≤ ηNL ] =
=
∫ η1
0
dx1
∫ η2
x1
dx2....
∫ ηNL
xNL−1
dxNL , (70)
where the series η1 ≤ η2 ≤ ... ≤ ηNL of inequalities ensure
the ordering. It is then straightforward to show that the average
values of the q(pin) are equidistant, i.e. the difference between
any two neighboring factors, on average, is independent of n,
so that
∆ ≡ 〈q(pin)〉 − 〈q(pin+1)〉 = const . (71)
Taking their average values as determining their typical values,
we omit the symbol 〈.〉 representing the average operator and
use the previous equation to represent the n-th attraction factor
as
q(pin) = qmax − (n− 1)∆ . (72)
From the alternation property (17), it follows that
qmax =
NL − 1
2
∆ . (73)
The total number of lotteries NL can be either even or
odd, leading to slightly different forms for the following
expressions.
And the definition of the typical value (58) gives
∆ =
 4q/NL (NL even)
4qNL/(N
2
L − 1) (NL odd)
. (74)
Then the maximal attraction factor (73) becomes
qmax =
 2q(NL − 1)/NL (NL even)
2qNL/(NL + 1) (NL odd)
. (75)
Therefore formula (72) yields the expressions for all attraction
factors
q(pin) =

2q NL+1−2nNL (NL even)
2q NL(NL+1−2n)
N2L−1
(NL odd)
. (76)
Let us denote the set of all attraction factors in the consid-
ered game as
QNL ≡ {q(pin) : n = 1, 2, . . . , NL} .
If there are only two lotteries, then we have
∆ = 2q , qmax = q (NL = 2) ,
and the attraction-factor set is
Q2 = {q, −q} .
In the case of three lotteries,
∆ =
3
2
q , qmax =
3
2
q (NL = 3) ,
and the attraction factor set reads as
Q3 =
{
3
2
q, 0, −3
2
q
}
.
In that way, all attraction factors can be defined.
VI. QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIONS IN DECISION MAKING
In order to illustrate how the suggested theory makes it
possible to give quantitative predictions, without any fitting
parameters, let us consider the set of experiments performed by
Kahneman and Tversky [19]. This collection of games, includ-
ing both gains and losses, is a classical example showing the
inability of standard utility theory to provide even qualitatively
correct predictions as a result of the confusion caused by very
close or coinciding expected utilities. Let us emphasize that
the choice of these games has been done by Kahneman and
Tversky [19] in order to stress that standard decision making
cannot be applied for these games. This is why it is logical to
consider the same games and to show that the use of QDT does
allow us not only to qualitatively explain the correct choice,
but also that QDT provides quantitative predictions for such
difficult cases.
In the set of games described below, each game consists
of two lotteries Ln, with n = 1, 2. The number of decision
makers is about 100.
Recall that, as is explained in Sec. III, the choice between
lotteries corresponds to the choice between prospects (25)
including the action of selecting a lottery Ln under a set of
inconclusive events B representing hesitations and irrational
feelings. Therefore the choice, under uncertainty, between
lotteries Ln is equivalent to the choice between prospects pin.
The choice under uncertainty for the case of a binary lattice
can be characterized by the utility factors (41) to (43). We
take the linear utility function, whose convenience is in the
independence of the utility factors from the monetary units
used in the lottery payoffs. The attraction factors are calculated
by following the recipes described in Sec. IV and Sec. V.
We compare the prospect probabilities p(pin), theoretically
predicted by QDT, with the empirically observed fractions [19]
pexp(pin) ≡ N(pin)
N
of the decision makers choosing the prospect pin, with respect
to the total number N of decision makers taking part in the
experiments.
A. Lotteries with gains
Game 1. The lotteries are
L1 = {2.5, 0.33 | 2.4, 0.66 | 0, 0.01} , L2 = {2.4, 1} .
For this game, we shall show explicitly the related calculations,
while omitting the intermediate arithmetics in the following
cases.
The utilities of these lotteries are
U(L1) = 2.5× 0.33 + 2.4× 0.66 + 0× 0.01 = 2.409 ,
U(L2) = 2.4× 1 = 2.4 .
Their sum is
U(L1) + U(L2) = 2.409 + 2.4 = 4.809 .
The utility factors are close to each other,
f(pi1) =
2.409
4.809
= 0.501 , f(pi2) =
2.4
4.809
= 0.499 .
9For the lottery attractiveness (46), we find
a1 = 2.5× 100.33 + 2.4× 100.66 + 00.1 = 16.32 ,
a2 = 2.4× 101 = 24 ,
which gives
a1 + a2 = 16.32 + 24 = 40.32 .
The attraction indices (47) become
α1 =
16.32
40.32
= 0.405 , α2 =
2.4
40.32
= 0.595 .
Then the attraction difference (55) is
∆α = 0.405− 0.595 = −0.19 .
The negative attraction difference tells us that the first lottery
is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2), which suggests that the
second lottery is preferable, pi1 < pi2. The experimental
results confirm this, displaying the fractions of decision makers
choosing the respective lotteries as
pexp(pi1) = 0.18 , pexp(pi2) = 0.82 .
Thus, although the first lottery is more useful, having a
larger utility factor, it is less attractive, which makes it less
preferable.
Game 2. The lotteries are
L1 = {2.5, 0.33 | 0, 0.67} , L2 = {2.4, 0.34 | 0, 0.66} .
The following procedure is the same as in the first game.
Calculating the utility factors
f(pi1) = 0.503 , f(pi2) = 0.497 ,
we again see that the lottery utilities are close to each other, so
it is difficult to make the choice. For the lottery attractiveness,
we have
a1 = 16.57 , a2 = 5.25 ,
giving the attraction indices
α1 = 0.759 , α2 = 0.241 ,
and the attraction difference
∆α = 0.518 .
Now the latter is positive, showing that the first lottery is more
attractive, q(pi1) > q(pi2), which suggests that the first lottery
is preferable, pi1 > pi2. The experimental data for the related
fractions are
pexp(pi1) = 0.83 , pexp(pi2) = 0.17 ,
in agreement with the expectation that the first lottery is
preferable.
Game 3. The lotteries are
L1 = {4, 0.8 | 0, 0.2} , L2 = {3, 1} .
We calculate in the prescribed way the utility factors
f(pi1) = 0.516 , f(pi2) = 0.484 ,
lottery attractiveness,
a1 = 25.24 , a2 = 30 ,
and the attraction indices
α1 = 0.457 , α2 = 0.543 .
The negative attraction difference
∆α = −0.086
implies that the first lottery is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2),
which tells us that the second lottery should be preferable,
pi1 < pi2. Again this is in agreement with the experimental
results
pexp(pi1) = 0.2 , pexp(pi2) = 0.8 .
The first lottery is less preferable, despite it is more useful,
having a larger utility factor.
Game 4. The lotteries are
L1 = {4, 0.2 | 0, 0.8} , L2 = {3, 0.25 | 0, 0.75} .
Calculating the utility factors
f(pi1) = 0.516 , f(pi2) = 0.484 ,
lottery attractiveness
a1 = 6.34 , a2 = 5.33 ,
and the attraction indices
α1 = 0.543 , α2 = 0.457 ,
we find the positive attraction difference
∆α = 0.086 .
Hence the first lottery is more attractive q(pi1) > q(pi2), which
suggests that the first lottery is preferable, pi1 > pi2. The
experimental data
pexp(pi1) = 0.65 , pexp(pi2) = 0.35
confirm this expectation.
Game 5. The lotteries are
L1 = {6, 0.45 | 0, 0.55} , L2 = {3, 0.9 | 0, 0.1} .
The utility factors
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5
turn out to be equal, which makes it impossible to decide in the
frame of classical decision theory based on expected utilities.
Then we calculate the lottery attractiveness
a1 = 16.91 , a2 = 23.83 ,
and the related attraction indices
α1 = 0.415 , α2 = 0.585 .
The negative attraction difference
∆α = −0.17
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means that the first lottery is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2),
thence the second lottery is expected to be preferable, pi1 < pi2.
This is confirmed by the empirical data
pexp(pi1) = 0.14 , pexp(pi2) = 0.86 .
Game 6. The lotteries are
L1 = {6, 0.001 | 0, 0.999} , L2 = {3, 0.002 | 0, 0.998} .
Again their utility factors are equal to each other,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 .
The lottery attractiveness values
a1 = 6.01 , a2 = 3.01
yield the attraction indices
α1 = 0.666 , α2 = 0.334 ,
whose positive attraction difference
∆α = 0.332
implies that the first lottery is more attractive, q(pi1) > q(pi2),
which suggests that the first lottery should be preferable, pi1 >
pi2. The experimental results are
pexp(pi1) = 0.73 , pexp(pi2) = 0.27 ,
in agreement with the expectation.
Game 7. The lotteries are
L1 = {6, 0.25 | 0, 0.75} , L2 = {4, 0.25 | 2, 0.25 | 0, 0.5} .
Their equal utility factors,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 ,
do not allow us to make a choice based on their utility. We
calculate the lottery attractiveness
a1 = 10.67 , a2 = 10.67
and the attraction indices
α1 = 0.5 , α2 = 0.5 .
Here the attraction difference is zero, ∆α = 0, with the at-
traction indices being positive. Therefore, we resort to criterion
(51), for which the minimal gains are gmin1 = g
min
2 = 0. We
find that
p1(g
min
1 ) = 0.75 > p2(g
min
2 ) = 0.5 .
According to definitions (51) and (52), the marginal case,
when α1 = α2 and p1(gmin1 ) > p2(g
min
2 ), is denoted as
∆α = −0. This proposes that the first lottery is less attractive,
according to the negative sign
∆α = −0 .
Thus we find that q(pi1) < q(pi2), which suggests that the
second lottery is preferable, pi1 < pi2. The experimental results
give
pexp(pi1) = 0.18 , pexp(pi2) = 0.82 .
B. Lotteries with losses
In the previous seven games, the lotteries with gains were
considered. We now turn to lotteries with losses.
Game 8. The lotteries are
L1 = {−4, 0.8 | 0, 0.2} , L1 = {−3, 1} .
Following the same general procedure, we find the utility
factors
f(pi1) = 0.484 , f(pi2) = 0.516 ,
lottery attractiveness
a1 = −25.24 , a2 = −30 ,
and the attraction indices
α1 = −0.457 , α2 = −0.543 .
The positive attraction difference
∆α = 0.086
means that the first lottery is more attractive, q(pi1) > q(pi2),
because of which, we expect that the first lottery is preferable,
pi1 > pi2. The experiments give
pexp(pi1) = 0.92 , pexp(pi2) = 0.08 ,
confirming that the first lottery is preferable, although its utility
factor is smaller.
Game 9. The lotteries are
L1 = {−4, 0.2 | 0, 0.8} , L2 = {−3, 0.25 | 0, 0.75} .
With the utility factors
f(pi1) = 0.484 , f(pi2) = 0.516 ,
lottery attractiveness
a1 = −6.34 , a2 = −5.33 ,
and the attraction indices
α1 = −0.543 , α2 = −0.457 ,
the attraction difference is negative,
∆α = −0.086 .
Thence the first lottery is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2), and
we expect that the second lottery is preferable, pi1 < pi2. The
empirical data are
pexp(pi1) = 0.42 , pexp(pi2) = 0.58 .
Game 10. The lotteries are
L1 = {−3, 0.9 | 0, 0.1} , L2 = {−6, 0.45 | 0, 0.55} .
The utility factors are equal,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 ,
hence both lotteries are equally useful. But the lottery attrac-
tiveness is different,
a1 = −23.83 , a2 = −16.91 ,
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yielding the attraction indices
α1 = −0.585 , α2 = −0.415 .
The negative attraction difference
∆α = −0.17
signifies that the first lottery is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2),
which hints that the second lottery is preferable, pi1 < pi2. The
experimental results are
pexp(pi1) = 0.08 , pexp(pi2) = 0.92 .
Game 11. The lotteries are
L1 = {−3, 0.002 | 0, 0.998} ,
L2 = {−6, 0.001 | 0, 0.999} .
The utility factors are again equal to each other,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 ,
which makes it impossible to employ the classical utility
theory. But the lottery attractiveness
a1 = −3.01 , a2 = −59.86
and the attraction indices
α1 = −0.048 , α2 = −0.952
show that the attraction difference is positive,
∆α = 0.904 .
Therefore the first lottery is more attractive, q(pi1) > q(pi2),
which suggests that the first lottery is preferable, pi1 > pi2.
The experimental data are
pexp(pi1) = 0.7 , pexp(pi2) = 0.3 .
Game 12. The lotteries are
L1 = {−1, 0.5 | 0, 0.5} , L2 = {−0.5, 1} .
Again the equal utility factors,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 ,
do not allow for the choice based on the lottery utilities. But
calculating the lottery attractiveness
a1 = −3.16 , a2 = −5 ,
and the attraction indices
α1 = −0.387 , α2 = −0.613 ,
we see that the attraction difference is positive,
∆α = 0.226 .
This means that the first lottery is more attractive, q(pi1) >
q(pi2), thence the first lottery is expected to be preferable,
pi1 > pi2. The empirical results are
pexp(pi1) = 0.69 , pexp(pi2) = 0.31 .
Game 13. The lotteries are
L1 = {−6, 0.25 | 0, 0.75} ,
L2 = {−4, 0.25 | − 2, 0.25 | 0, 0.5} .
The utility factors are again equal,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 .
For the lottery attractiveness
a1 = −10.67 , a2 = −10.67 ,
the attraction indices are also equal,
α1 = −0.5 , α2 = −0.5 .
Getting the zero attraction difference, ∆α = 0, with negative
attraction indices, we have to involve criterion (52). The
minimal losses are
lmin1 = l
min
2 = 0 .
And we find
p1(0) = 0.75 > p2(0) = 0.5 .
Consequently, the first lottery is more attractive, which can be
denoted as
∆α = +0 .
The stronger attractiveness of the first lottery, when q(pi1) >
q(pi2), suggests that the first lottery should be preferable, pi1 >
pi2. The experimental data are
pexp(pi1) = 0.7 , pexp(pi2) = 0.3 .
Game 14. The lotteries are
L1 = {−5, 0.001 | 0, 0.999} , L2 = {−0.005, 1} .
Although the utility factors are equal,
f(pi1) = 0.5 , f(pi2) = 0.5 ,
but the lottery attractiveness
a1 = −5.01 , a2 = −0.05
defines different attraction indices
α1 = −0.99 , α2 = −0.01 .
The negative attraction difference
∆α = −0.98
implies that the first lottery is less attractive, q(pi1) < q(pi2).
Then the second lottery is expected to be preferable, pi1 < pi2.
The experimental results
pexp(pi1) = 0.17 , pexp(pi2) = 0.83
confirm this expectation.
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TABLE I
THE THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS OF QDT ARE COMPARED WITH THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM REF. [19]. HERE: f(pi1) IS THE UTILITY FACTOR OF
THE FIRST LOTTERY, δf IS THE IRRESOLUTENESS DISTANCE (62), α(L1) IS THE ATTRACTION INDEX OF THE FIRST LOTTERY, p(pi1) IS THE PREDICTED
PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING THE FIRST LOTTERY, pexp(pi1) IS THE EXPERIMENTALLY OBSERVED FRACTION OF DECISION MAKERS PREFERRING THE
FIRST LOTTERY, qexp(pi1) IS THE EMPIRICALLY OBSERVED ATTRACTION FACTOR FOR THE FIRST LOTTERY, ∆p IS THE PREDICTION ERROR.
f(pi1) δf% α(L1) ∆α p(pi1) pexp(pi1) qexp(pi1) ∆p
1 0.501 0.4 0.405 -0.19 0.23 0.18 -0.32 0.05
2 0.503 1.2 0.759 0.52 0.78 0.83 0.33 0.05
3 0.516 6.4 0.457 -0.09 0.24 0.20 -0.32 0.04
4 0.516 6.4 0.543 0.09 0.79 0.65 0.13 0.14
5 0.5 0 0.415 -0.17 0.23 0.14 -0.36 0.09
6 0.5 0 0.666 0.33 0.77 0.73 0.23 0.04
7 0.5 0 0.5 -0 0.23 0.18 -0.32 0.05
8 0.484 6.4 -0.457 0.09 0.76 0.92 0.44 0.16
9 0.484 6.4 -0.543 -0.09 0.21 0.42 -0.06 0.21
10 0.5 0 -0.585 -0.17 0.23 0.08 -0.42 0.15
11 0.5 0 -0.048 0.90 0.77 0.70 0.20 0.07
12 0.5 0 -0.378 0.23 0.77 0.69 0.19 0.08
13 0.5 0 -0.5 +0 0.77 0.70 0.20 0.07
14 0.5 0 -0.99 -0.98 0.23 0.17 -0.33 0.06
C. Empirical test of quantitative predictions of empirical
choice frequencies
As is explained at the beginning of Sec. VI, the considered
lotteries have been selected by Kahneman and Tversky [19]
in order to demonstrate the failure of standard utility theory.
All these lotteries exhibit close or even equal expected utili-
ties, which makes the choice between them difficult or even
undecided in the frame of utility theory. The majority of the
lotteries are irresolute in the sense of criterion (63). But we
show that in the frame of QDT, this set of lotteries is treatable.
Among the 14 considered games, the choice is irresolute
in 9 games according to rule (63), leading to the fraction
ν = 9/14 of irresolute games. Therefore the typical attraction
factor (67) is predicted to be
q = 0.274
(
ν =
9
14
)
. (77)
Then the quantitative predictions for each of the games are
determined by the formulas
p(pi1) = f(pi1) + q sgn(∆α) ,
p(pi2) = f(pi2)− q sgn(∆α) . (78)
These predictions are compared with the empirical results from
Ref. [19] in Table 1. For each game, we show the utility factor
f(pi1) defined by equations (41) or (42), the utility difference
(62) providing a classification of the game irresoluteness,
the attraction index (47), the attraction difference (55), and
the predicted probability p(pi1), which is compared with the
experimentally observed fraction pexp(pi1) of decision makers
preferring prospect pi1. We also report the empirically observed
attraction factor defined by
qexp(pi1) = pexp(pi1)− f(pi1) ,
and the error of our theoretical prediction, as compared to the
empirical data,
∆p = |p(pi1)− pexp(pi1)| .
The results for f(pi2), α(L2), p(pi2), pexp(pi2), and qexp(pi2)
are not shown, since they are straightforwardly connected by
the appropriate normalization conditions.
The median (resp. average) error is 0.07 (resp. 0.09). which
are within the statistical accuracy of the experiment.
We also compare the predicted typical attraction factor (77),
with that calculated by equation (57) using the experimental
data. The empirically found result is
qexp = 0.275 ,
which is in beautiful agreement with the predicted value (77).
VII. QUANTUM DECISION MAKING IN GAME THEORY
We have shown that Quantum Decision Theory (QDT) pro-
vides the basis for an accurate description of human decision
making. Since decision making is also the basis of game
theory, it is important to delineate the relation of QDT to game
theory.
Quantum game theory, originated by Meyer [62] considers
game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms.
There exist several good reviews on quantum game theory
[63]–[66]). Generally, quantum game theory, merging game
theory and quantum mechanics, suggests two perspectives,
with the common factor between the two perspectives being
quantum information. In one perspective, players are not
assumed to be quantum devices, although their conscious
processes are described by quantum techniques taking into
account the dual nature of consciousness, consisting of rational
as well as irrational components. In this approach, games are
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treated as representing realistic situations in human decision
making. From the other side, quantum mechanics as such can
be treated as a collection of quantum games, which sheds
insights into the nature of quantum algorithms. The discussion
of these two perspectives can be found in Refs. [67], [68]. The
relation of our Quantum Decision Theory to game theory is
explained below in more details.
A. Reformulation of games into lottery sets
In the previous sections, it has been shown how QDT is
applied to the choice between several lotteries. To follow the
same way, we need to reformulate a game into a lottery set,
after which we can directly employ the same QDT decision-
making approach. For illustration, let us consider the typical
structure of a two-by-two game. That is, we consider two
players, each of which can accomplish two actions, say A1
and A2. Then there are four strategies
smn = {Am, An} (m,n = 1, 2) ,
where the action Am corresponds to the first player and An, to
the second player. The game is characterized by eight payoffs
xj(smn), with j = 1, 2. The standard form of a payoff matrix
is shown in Table II.
As has been explained above, the use of QDT is senseful
only when there exists uncertainty in decision making. But,
when all actions are absolutely certain, being uniquely defined,
the QDT reduces to classical decision making, in agreement
with the quantum-classical correspondence principle (15). This
implies that QDT should be applied to mixed games, where
actions are taken in the presence of uncertainty. For this
purpose, we introduce a probability measure {pj(An)}, with
the usual properties
0 ≤ pj(An) ≤ 1 , pj(A1) + pj(A2) = 1 .
The notation pj(An) defines a probability that the j-th player
takes the action An.
The characteristic feature of games is that the payoffs of one
player depend on the action of the other player, accomplished
with the related probability. For example, the payoff x1(smn)
of the first player, taking an action Am, is conditioned by
the other player action An, accomplished with the probability
p2(An). Then the mixed game, corresponding to the matrix in
Table II, can be reformulated as the choice between lotteries.
Thus, the first player has to choose between two lotteries
L1(A1) = {x1(s11), p2(A1) | x1(s12), p2(A2)} ,
L1(A2) = {x1(s21), p2(A1) | x1(s22), p2(A2)} ,
that is, the first player has to decide between the actions A1
and A2, whose payoffs depend on the actions of the second
player. Respectively, the second player chooses between the
lotteries
L2(A1) = {x2(s11), p1(A1) | x2(s21), p1(A2)} ,
L2(A2) = {x2(s12), p1(A1) | x2(s22), p1(A2)} .
Introducing the payoff utility of a strategy sij for the n-th
player,
un(sij) ≡ un(xn(sij)) ,
TABLE II
GENERAL FORM OF A PAYOFF MATRIX
player 1 \ player 2 A1 A2
A1 x1(s11), x2(s11) x1(s12), x2(s12)
A2 x1(s21), x2(s21) x1(s22), x2(s22)
it is straightforward to define the lottery expected utilities, for
the first player,
U(L11) = u1(s11)p2(A1) + u1(s12)p2(A2) ,
U(L12) = u1(s21)p2(A1) + u1(s22)p2(A2) ,
and for the second player
U(L21) = u2(s11)p1(A1) + u2(s21)p1(A2) ,
U(L22) = u2(s12)p1(A1) + u2(s22)p1(A2) ,
where Ljn ≡ Lj(An).
After the game is reformulated into the approach of choos-
ing between lotteries, which is usual for decision theory, it
is possible to resort to QDT as we illustrate in the next
subsection.
B. Quantum decision making in the prisoner dilemma problem
For concreteness, let us consider the prisoner dilemma that
is a canonical example of a game analyzed in game theory.
Numerous other games enjoy the same structure as the prisoner
dilemma. Here the action A1 corresponds to keeping silence,
not betraying the other prisoner, while A2 denotes the action
of betraying the other prisoner.
To apply QDT, we need the variant of the prisoner dilemma,
where two players make decisions under uncertainty, without
knowing the choice of the other agent, as has been treated in
Ref. [19]. In that setup, the j-th player, taking an action An is
not aware of the action accomplished by the other player. The
admissible set of actions of the other player is an inconclusive
event
B = {A1, A2} ,
in agreement with definition (5).
In order to avoid excessive notations, let us denote the
choice of a lottery Lj(An) by the same symbol. Then the
prospect of choosing this lottery by the j-th player, under the
unknown choice of the other player, is
pijn = Lj(An)
⊗
B . (79)
Following the techniques of Sec. II, we get the prospect
probabilities
p(pijn) = f(pijn) + q(pijn) . (80)
Since we aim at analyzing the prisoner dilemma, we should
keep in mind that this game is symmetric, such that the payoffs
of the same strategies are the same for both players:
x1(s11) = x2(s11) ≡ a1 , x1(s12) = x2(s21) ≡ a2 ,
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x1(s21) = x2(s12) ≡ a3 , x1(s22) = x2(s22) ≡ a4 ,
where the values ai are assumed to be non-negative.
For generality, we may interpret the strategy payoffs as
utilities, so that
un(sij) −→ xn(sij) .
It is assumed that each player knows nothing about the choice
of the other player, who can take any of the two actions with
no informative prior, that is, with equal probability pj(An) =
1/2. Then the expected utilities of the lotteries to be chosen
by the players are
U(L11) = U(L21) =
1
2
(a1 + a2) ,
U(L12) = U(L22) =
1
2
(a3 + a4) .
Because of the symmetry, it is sufficient to consider just one
of the players. Thus, the utility factors for the j-th player,
according to QDT, are
f(pij1) =
a1 + a2
a1 + a2 + a3 + a4
,
f(pij2) =
a3 + a4
a1 + a2 + a3 + a4
.
The specific feature of the prisoner dilemma is that the
relations between payoffs are such that
a1 < a3 , a2 < a4 .
From this, it immediately follows that
f(pij1) < f(pij2) ,
hence for each prisoner it is more useful to betray the other.
This strategy is the Nash equilibrium in the classical prisoner
dilemma.
However, in QDT, we have to consider not merely the
utility, but the whole prospect probability (80). As is explained
above, a more useful prospect may turn out to be not the
most attractive. In the prisoner dilemma, each prisoner takes
a decision “betray or not betray” under the uncertainty of
what has been decided by the other prisoner. According to
the principle of uncertainty and risk aversion [22], [23], [40],
in the choice under uncertainty, decision makers are more
inclined to be passive, not acting. In the present case, this
means that not betraying is a more attractive action, hence
q(pij1) > q(pij2) .
As is explained in Sec. V, under a complete ignorance of
the actions of the other player, the attraction factors can be
evaluated by employing the method of non-informative priors,
yielding the quarter law, telling that the absolute values of
the attraction factors are equal to 1/4. This tells us that the
prospect probabilities are given by the expressions
p(pij1) = f(pij1) + 0.25 , p(pij2) = f(pij2)− 0.25 .
The first of these is the probability for the prospect of not
betraying, while the second one is the probability for the
prospect of betraying.
Generally, the utility factors are influenced by the related
payoff strategies. The typical values of utilities can be found
by measuring the fraction of decision makers, taking the
related decisions, when knowing the actions chosen by the
other player, as has been done by Kahneman and Tversky
[19], who found the fractions corresponding to f(pij1) = 0.1
and f(pij2) = 0.9. A more detailed discussion of this has been
given in Ref. [40].
Summarizing, we find that QDT predicts the prospect prob-
abilities
p(pij1) = 0.35 , p(pij2) = 0.65 .
Thence, despite the fact that the utility of not betraying is very
small with the utility factor f(pij1) = 0.1, the probability of
not betraying is larger, being p(pij1) = 0.35. This difference is
predicted by QDT. The empirical data, observed by Kahneman
and Tversky [19], when each of the players decides under
uncertainty, are the fractions
pexp(pij1) = 0.37 , pexp(pij2) = 0.63 ,
which is in remarkable agreement with the prediction of QDT.
VIII. PROLEGOMENA TO ARTIFICIAL QUANTUM
INTELLIGENCE
As is emphasized in the Introduction, the developed QDT
theory not only provides a good description of human decision
making, allowing for quantitative predictions, but also can
serve as a basic scheme for creating artificial intelligence [69].
Actually, as has been shown above, realistic human decision
making can be interpreted as being characterized by quantum
rules. This is not because humans are quantum objects, but
because the process of making decisions is dual, including
both a rational evaluation of utility as well as subconscious
evaluation of attractiveness. The dual nature of the decision
process is effectively taken into account by the mathematics
of quantum theory. Since artificial intelligence is assumed to
mimic human mental processes, it has to function similarly to
human decision making. That is, an artificial intelligence has
to necessarily employ a type of quantum decision making. It
is in that sense that an artificial intelligence is to be quantum.
Artificial intelligence is not the same as just a powerful
computer, as one often assumes, but it is a rather different
device functioning as a human brain, hence taking into account
the dual nature of decision processes. A principal scheme of
an artificial intelligence, functioning according to Quantum
Decision Theory, is shown in Fig. 1.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have suggested a formulation providing quantitative
predictions for the fraction of decision makers choosing a
given prospect among a set of alternatives. This formulation
has the virtue of being parameter-free. The approach is based
on Quantum Decision Theory (QDT) developed earlier by the
authors. In the present paper, the theory has been generalized
in several important aspects that are crucial for the develop-
ment of such quantitative predictions:
(i) A general method for defining utility factors is advanced,
valid for lotteries with losses as well as for lotteries with gains.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of basic elements of artificial quantum intelligence.
(ii) A criterion is formulated for the quantitative classifica-
tion of attraction factors for all kinds of lotteries, whether with
gains or with losses. In the case of games with two lotteries,
this criterion uniquely prescribes the signs of attraction factors.
(iii) The quarter law is generalized by taking into account
the irresoluteness of a given set of games. This defines the
typical absolute value of the attraction factor more accurately
than the quarter law based on a non-informative prior.
(iv) A method for estimating attraction factors for games
with multiple (more than two) lotteries is described.
(v) The theory is illustrated by a set of games containing
lotteries with gains and with losses, for which expected
utility theory fails, while our approach results in quantitative
predictions, without fitting parameters, being in very good
agreement with empirical data.
(vi) It is demonstrated how games considered in game
theory can be reformulated as sets of lotteries. This opens
up the possibility of employing the techniques of QDT for
mixed games containing uncertainty.
(vii) The mathematical formalization of all steps of decision
making provided by our approach is important not only
for accurate quantitative predictions of decision making by
humans, but it can serve as a guiding scheme for creating
artificial intelligence [41]. For this, it is necessary, first of all,
to understand the basic structure of human decision making.
As we have shown, our suggested approach captures the main
features of decision making by humans, and gives rather
accurate quantitative predictions. We suggest that the structure
of artificial intelligence has to include the basic features of
the developed QDT approach. A principal scheme of artificial
quantum intelligence is proposed.
The theory described in the present paper is only a first
step in the full mathematical formalization of the decision
making process. Actually, what we have described is a one-
step decision making. In multistep decision making, because
of additional information acquired by agents, the choice can
change [70]. To characterize the sequence of decisions taken
by decision makers who are the members of a society, it is
necessary to generalize the approach by taking into account
dynamical effects influencing the temporal evolution of deci-
sions due to the exchange of information among social deci-
sion makers. First attempts of generalizing QDT to account
for temporal effects, caused by the amount of information
among social decision makers, have been considered in Refs.
[26], [40], where it was assumed that all decision makers in
a society simultaneously get the same information. A more
realistic situation of decision makers exchanging information
with each other and varying their decisions accordingly will
be presented in a following paper.
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